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Public Policy Violations or Permitted
Provisions?: The Validity of Exculpatory
Provisions in Residential Leases
Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group'
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been established in Missouri that a party may be contractually
relieved from any claims of negligence through the use of exculpatory clauses.2
Missouri courts have placed few limits on the use of such clauses, and the rule
has been applied expansively throughout the years,' resulting in the extension of
the rule to residential leases in Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Marilyn Warren lived in an apartment complex managed by Paragon
Technologies Group.' Before Warren moved into her apartment, she signed a
written lease containing an exculpatory clause.' The material portion of the
clause purported to relieve the apartment company from any liability for injury
to the resident "occurring in or about the Leased Premises or within the
Apartment Community from any cause whatsoever even if said damages or
injuries are alleged to be the fault of or caused by the negligence or carelessness
or fault of the Apartment Company."' The clause also stated that the resident
was to "indemnify and save the Apartment Company harmless from all loss,
damage, liability and expense ... which Resident might incur."8 While Warren
1. No. 79539, 1997 WL 471917 (Mo. Aug. 20, 1997). After rendering its own
opinion, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District transferred the case to the
Missouri Supreme Court on December 24, 1996. See Warren v. Paragon Technologies
Group, No. 69866, 1996 WL 741844 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1996).
2. Rock Springs Realty, Inc. v. Waid, 392 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo. 1965).
3. See Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, Inc., 250 S.W.2d 692, 696
(Mo. 1952); Hornbeck v. All American Indoor Sports, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1995).
4. Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, No. 79539, 1997 WL 471917 (Mo.
Aug. 20, 1997).
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was a tenant, she was injured when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice outside
her apartment complex.9
The trial court ruled that the exculpatory clause was void as against public
policy and sent the case to the jury. The jury returned a $38,000 verdict for
Warren.' 0 On appeal, the defendants argued that the exculpatory clause was a
valid contractual defense to Warren's claim." Warren argued, however, that
although Missouri courts have upheld exculpatory clauses in commercial leases,
the court should not extend the rule to residential leases.'
Warren also made three additional arguments. First, she argued that the
contract language was a release that was not effective because no bona fide
controversy existed at the time of the claimed release. 3 Second, she argued the
exculpatory clause was a covenant not to sue that failed ,for lack of
consideration. 4  Third, Warren argued that the contract language was
"meaningless boilerplate."' 5 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District disagreed with thejudgment of the trial court. 6 However, because of the
general interest and importance of the matter, the court of appeals transferred the
case to the Missouri Supreme Court.' 7 The supreme court reversed the judgment
of the trial court, but remanded the case to give the plaintiff the opportunity to
properly answer the defendants' affirmative defense of release."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
Although exculpatory clauses in contracts have been in existence for many
years, no clear majority rule has been established regarding their enforceability. 9
In Missouri, it has long been the rule that covenants relieving parties of future
negligence are not void per se as against public policy." Missouri courts have
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Warren, 1996 WL 741844 at *1 -*2.
12. Id. at *2.
13. Id.




18. Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, No. 79539, 1997 WL 471917 (Mo.
Aug. 20, 1997).
19. Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tenn. 1992); McCutcheon v.
United Homes Corp., 486 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Wash. 1971).
20. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, Inc., 250 S.W.2d 692, 698
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recognized this general rule may not apply in cases involving gross negligence,
fraud, unequal bargaining power, or a public interest.2' However, if the contract
does not involve the public, but rather private parties, Missouri courts have
declared that no public interest exists, and thus no public policy can be
violated.22
In Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, Inc.,' the court upheld
an exculpatory clause between a landlord and tenant in a commercial lease. The
Kansas City court explained that a landlord could accept lower rent in exchange
for the tenant's agreement to release the landlord from any liability.24 In Warren,
the court took this rationale one step further when it upheld an exculpatory
clause in a residential lease.2"
Although Missouri courts have declared that exculpatory clauses are not per
se void,26 such clauses are disfavored and will be strictly construed against the
party claiming the benefit of the contract.2 Therefore, exculpatory provisions
must meet certain requirements before most courts will render them valid and
enforceable.
B. Language Required
The intention to release one from his or her negligent acts must be clearly
and expressly stated "in plain terms.""8 Missouri courts have defined "plain
terms" to be those terms which are both unambiguous and understandable.29 The
exculpatory provision "should not compel resort to a magnifying glass and
lexicon."3 An intention to relieve one of liability will not be assumed in absence
of such express wording.3 These rules apply to provisions benefitting the lessee
as well as the lessor.32
(Mo. 1952).
21. Id.
22. Id. See also Rock Springs Realty, Inc. v. Waid, 392 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo.
1965).
23. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 250 S.W.2d at 692.
24. Id. at 698.
25. Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, No. 79539, 1997 WL 471917, at *4
(Mo. Aug. 20, 1997).
26. Rock Springs Realty, 392 S.W.2d at 272.
27. Hornbeck v. All American Indoor Sports, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995).
28. Rock Springs Realty, 392 S.W.2d at 271.
29. Alack v. Vic Tanny Intl, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 335-36 (Mo. 1996).
30. Id. at 335.
31. Poslosky v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 349 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo. 1961).
32. Rock Springs Realty, 392 S.W.2d at 273.
1997]
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Most states that have chosen to enforce exculpatory clauses require the
language of the clause to include specific reference to the negligence or fault of
the drafter.33 InAlack v. Vic Tanny International, Inc.,34 the Missouri Supreme
Court chose to follow the lead of other states that require the words
"negligence," "fault," or their equivalent in the exculpatory provision before a
claim for negligence will be barred.35
The Alack court refused to bar a claim for negligence where the words of
the exculpatory provision attempted to shield the company from "any damages,"
"any injuries" and "any and all claims, demands, damages, rights of action,
present or future ... resulting or arising out of the Member's ... use... of said
gymnasium or the facilities and equipment thereof."'36 The court stated that such
language was ambiguous since it did not specifically state that the club was
released from its own negligence. In addition, the all-inclusive words
incorporated claims arising from intentional torts, gross negligence, and
activities involving the public interest-claims which can never be waived.37 The
Alack court stated, "[a] contract that purports to relieve a party from any and all
claims but does not actually do so is duplicitous, indistinct and uncertain."38 The
Alack court explained that without such language, "while one might accept the
risks inherently associated with any particular activity, it does not follow that he
was aware of, much less intended to accept, any enhanced exposure to injury
occasioned by the carelessness of the very person on which he depended for his
safety."39 The court suggested, however, that less precise language may be
appropriate in cases where both parties are sophisticated commercial entities.4"
Whatever the situation may be, for an exculpatory clause to succeed, a
reasonable person must know and understand what he is contracting away.4
33. Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 334.
34. Id. at 330.
35. See Geise v. County of Niagara, 458 N.Y.S.2d 162, 164 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (words
"fault" or "neglect" must be used to bar a liability claim); Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403
A.2d 1206, 1208 (Me. 1979) (express reference to negligence required before release is
effective); Haugen v. Ford Motor Co., 219 N.W.2d 462, 470 (N.D. 1974) (without a
reference to negligence, there is no "plain and precise" intent to limit liability); Blum v.
Kauffman, 297 A.2d 48, 49 (Del. 1972) (where the word negligence was not used,
release did not "clearly and equivocally" show intent to bar liability claim).
36. Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 335.
40. ld. at 338 n.4.
41. Id. at 337-38.
[Vol. 62
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Other states have not required specific mention of the words "fault" or
"negligence."42 However, the majority of these jurisdictions still require the
release to be clear and conspicuous.43 The difference in rulings results from
different ideas of what constitutes clear and conspicuous language.
C. Public Policy
"The exculpatory clause frequently places the courts in a precarious position
of choosing between two fundamental concepts of our legal system."'
Jurisdictions should consider the countervailing principles of freedom of contract
and responsibility for One's own actions when deciding whether to uphold
exculpatory provisions.45 The majority of states have protected the freedom of
contract interest when the exculpatory provision is clear and conspicuous. 46
However, language is not the only consideration in determining the validity
of an exculpatory provision. Courts also consider whether the contract involves
a public interest whether the parties entered into the contract fairly, and whether
the item contracted for is a practical necessity. An increasing number of courts
have found that exculpatory clauses in residential leases involve a public
interest.4 Courts also have found that the landlord-tenant relationship, along
with the evolution of standardized form leases containing exculpatory clauses,
causes grossly unequal bargaining power, making it "fruitless" for a tenant to
search for a lease without such a clause.49 In Galligan v. Arovitch, ° the
42. See Hardage Enters. v. Fidesys Corp., 570 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) ("any and all claims" language is sufficient); Neumann v. Gloria Marshall Figure
Salon, 500 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Il1 1986); Audley v. Melton, 640 A.2d 777 (N.H. 1994)
(word "negligence" not required but language of the contract must still give clear notice
to plaintiff); Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979) (while word
"negligence" is not necessary, words conveying similar meaning must be included in
release to bar claim).
43. Alack v. Vic Tanny Intl, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. 1996); See Hardage,
570 So. 2d at 437; Audley, 640 A.2d 777; Gross, 400 N.E.2d at 310.
44. Mitchell 0. Moore, Country Club Apartments v. Scott: Exculpatory Clauses
in Leases Declared Void, 32 MERCER L. REV. 419, 421 (1980).
45. Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1996).
46. See supra notes 28-35.
47. See, e.g., Garretson v. United States, 456 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1972) (upholding
exculpatory clause against ski jumper); Boucher v. Riner, 514 A.2d 485 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1986) (upholding exculpatory provision in contract for parachute lessons because
sport was not "of practical necessity"); Audley, 640 A.2d at 777 (N.H. 1994) (upholding
exculpatory clause because working with wild animals not considered essential activity).
48. See, e.g., Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. 1992); McCutcheon
v. United Homes Corp., 486 P.2d 1093 (Wash. 1971).
49. See, e.g., Henrioulle v. Marvin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1978);
1997]
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that "[t]here is no meeting of the minds,
and the [exculpatory] agreement is in effect a mere contract of adhesion,
whereby the tenant simply adheres to a document which he is powerless to alter,
having no alternative other than to reject the transaction entirely."'" One court
has found that the mere existence of an exculpatory clause was a sign of unequal
bargaining power."2 However, where a person "can, at small cost to himself,
simply refuse to be in the market altogether," no unequal bargaining power
exists.53
Additional concerns are that tenants, preoccupied with other aspects of
housing such as price and location, might unknowingly agree to exculpatory
provisions, and that such provisions may affect personal health and safety. 4 In
Feldman v. Stein Building & Lumber Co., s the court stated, "While affirming
the principle of freedom of contract, we note the well-settled rule that where
freedom of contract and declared public policy are in conflict, the former
necessarily must yield to the latter."56
A few jurisdictions have adopted a strict rule by disallowing exculpatory
provisions in any situation. While most states allow some type of exculpatory
provisions, many have disallowed them in residential leases, considering them
to be against public policy." Other states are following the current trend and
Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463 (Pa. 1966); Stanley, 911 P.2d at 705.
50. 219 A.2d 463 (Pa. 1966).
51. Id. at 465.
52. See Cardona v. Eden Realty Co., 288 A.2d 34 (N.J. 1972).
53. Todd D. Radoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1173, 1284 n.243 (1983) (noting differences between essential and non-essential
activities).
54. See William K. Jones, Private Revision of Public Standards: Exculpatory
Agreements in Leases, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 717 (1988).
55. 148 N.W.2d 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967).
56. Id. at 546.
57. Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 339 (Mo. 1996). See, e.g.,
Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 143 A.2d 466 (Conn. 1958);
Walker v. Self Serv. Storage & Miniwarehouses, Inc., 492 So. 2d 210 (La. Ct. App.
1986); Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1986) (discussing MONT. CODE
ANN. § 28-2-702 (1980); Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1983)).
58. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Serv. Corp., Inc., 453 So. 2d 735, 739 (Ala. 1984) (though
not void per se); Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705, 707 (Colo. 1996); Tenants
Council v. DeFranceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560 (D.C. 1969); Weaver v. American Oil Co.,
276 N.E.2d 144 (nd. 1971) (such clauses void in all leases); Feldman v. Stein Building
& Lumber Co., 148 N.W.2d 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967); Papakalos v. Shaka, 18 A.2d
377, 379 (N.H. 1941); Ultimate Computer Services, Inc. v. Biltmore Realty Co., 443
A.2d 723 (N.J. 1982); Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463 (Pa. 1966); Crawford v.
Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tenn. 1992); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va.
[Vol. 62
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have either forbidden or limited the use of exculpatory provisions in residential
leases through statutory enactment. 9
While it is clear that few jurisdictions approach the problem in quite the
same way, courts often examine two main factors to balance the two interests of
freedom of contract and responsibility for one's actions. First, courts determine
whether residential leases involve a public interest. Second, courts determine the
relative bargaining power of the parties.
Applying a variation of this test, the Colorado Court of Appeals, in Stanley
v. Creighton,' first determined whether the subject matter of the contract
"concern[ed] a duty to the public and whether the type of services performed
affect[ed] the public interest."'" Second, the court determined whether the
parties fairly entered into the contract and whether they used clear and
unambiguous language.62 The Stanley court found that a landlord's services are
generally held out to the public and that housing is a practical necessity to the
public.' For this reason, the court found that public policy is a more important
issue in residential leases than in commercial leases.' In addition, the court
recognized a disparity of bargaining power in the average residential landlord-
1979).
59. See Moore, supra note 44. Moore notes that these statutes include: ALASKA
STAT. § 34.03.040 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1315 (West 1990); CAL.
[Civ.] CODE § 1953 (West 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-41 (West 1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 83.47 (West 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-2(b) (1991); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 521-33 (1993); IOVA CODEANN. § 562A.11 (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2547
(1994); Ky. REv. STAT. § 383.570 (Supp. 1996); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15
(West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-
24-202 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1415(1) (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.220
(1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-16 (Michie Supp. 1997); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
321 (McKinney 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(D) (Anderson Supp. 1996); OR.
REV. STAT. § 90.245 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAws. § 34-18-17 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-
40-330 (Law. Co-op. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4457(b) (1993); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 704.07(1) (West Supp. 1996). But see MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROPERTY § 8-105
(1996) (clauses allowed for areas within exclusive control of tenant); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-42(b) (1996) (tenant may undertake specific duties to relieve landowner); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-32-8 (Michie 1997); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 66-28-102, 66-28-203(a) (1993) (prohibited in counties with population of
at least 200,000); TEX. [PROP.] CODE ANN. § 92.006 (West 1995) (clause must be
specific, in bold writing, and for consideration).
60. Stanley, 911 P.2d at 705.
61. Id. at 706.
62. Id. at 707.




Read: Read: Public Policy Violations or Permitted Provisions:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
MISSOURILAWREVIEW
tenant relationship.6" In the alternative, the court recognized the legislature's
regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship, which included a specific
provision in the statutes dealing with liability of landowners.6 Although the
court applied the two-part test, the court explained that it was unnecessary to do
so because the statute clearly established the state's public policy. For these
reasons, the court held that the exculpatory clause was void as against public
policy.67
Even in the absence of legislation prohibiting exculpatory clauses, several
states have declared that public policy is defined by regulatory statutes and
housing codes, and that private parties cannot contract to relieve such
obligations." "[H]ousing code[s] impose[ some duties upon owners and others
upon occupants; neither can insulate himself from the duties imposed by law by
making private arrangements with others."69 Other states extend this rationale
to duties imposed by common law.7 ' Nonetheless, at least one court has refused
to accept housing codes as evidence of public policy.7
In Lloyd v. Service Corp.,72 the Alabama Supreme Court used a five-part
test to determine the public policy issue. Using this test, a court must determine:
1) whether the service provided by the contract is of public necessity; 2) whether
a significant number of people are forced to use the service; 3) whether the
transaction places one party under the control of the other and makes him
vulnerable to the other's carelessness; 4) whether the bargaining power of the
parties is equal; and 5) whether there is a legislative policy against
unconscionable contracts. 73
In its analysis of these factors, the Lloyd court examined the history of
residential leases. The court noted that, unlike in the past, the rental industry
now is responsible for a large percentage of the housing units in the Alabama
65. Id.
66. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-115 (West 1997).
67. Stanley v. Creighton, 911 P.2d 705, 709 (Colo. 1996).
68. See John's Pass Seafood Co. v. Weber, 369 So. 2d 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Panaroni v. Johnson, 256 A.2d 246 (Conn. 1969).
69. Panaroni, 256 A.2d at 254.
70. See Tenants Council v. DeFranceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560 (D.D.C. 1964); George
Washington Univ. v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43 (D.C. 1983) (recognizing implied warranty
of habitability as duty which cannot be waived); Papakalos v. Shaka, 18 A.2d 377, 379
(N.H. 1941) (recognizing common law duty to use ordinary care); Cerny Pickas & Co.
v. C.R. Jahn Co., 106 N.E.2d 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952); Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc.,
111 A.2d 425,428 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955) (recognizing landlord's common law
duty to maintain premises under his control).
71. Matthews v. Mountain Lodge Apartments, 388 So. 2d 935 (Ala. 1980).
72. 453 So. 2d 735 (Ala. 1984).
73. Lloyd, 453 So. 2d at 738.
[Vol. 62
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and affects the lives of thousands.74 In addition, the relationship between the
landlord and tenant subjects the tenant to the landlord's acts of carelessness since
the landlord, in most cases, is responsible for repairs. This makes the tenant
dependent upon the landlord." Third, the court noted that tenants have no
meaningful choice in the matter. The tenant can either accept the exculpatory
terms or go elsewhere, where similar or identical terms are likely to exist.76
"Th[e] consumer, in need of goods or services, is frequently not in a position to
shop around for better terms, because all competitors use the same clauses."
77
In previous decisions, the Alabama courts held that residential leases did
not involve a public interest, and, thus, exculpatory clauses were not violative
of public policy.78 In Lloyd, while the court recognized that exculpatory clauses
in residential leases are not per se void, it stated that it would apply the five-part
test to determine whether a particular clause is violative of public policy.79
In Crawford v. Buckner," the Tennessee Supreme Court applied yet another
test. Adopting the six-part test first used in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of
California,8 the Crawford court examined: 1) whether the contract concerns a
business suitable for public regulation; 2) whether the service provided is of
public importance and public necessity; 3) whether the party holds himself out
to provide this service for anyone who seeks it, or who meets established
standards; 4) whether the party invoking exculpation has more bargaining power
because of the nature of the service provided; 5) whether, because of superior
bargaining power, the party presents the public with a standardized adhesion
contract and makes no provision allowing the public to obtain protection against
negligence; and 6) whether the person or property is placed under the control of
the seller, subject to risk of carelessness by the seller.82 The court noted, "It is
not necessary that all be present in any given transaction, but generally a
transaction that has some of these characteristics would be offensive." 83
In applying the Tunkl test to residential leases, the court determined that
residential leases involve a business that is suitable for regulation, based upon
the fact that several other state legislatures have regulated this area.84 The
Crawford court found that residential landlords offer shelter, a public necessity,
74. Id.
75. Id. at 738-39.
76. Id. at 739.
77. Id.
78. Lloyd, 453 So. 2d at 738.
79. Id.
80. 839 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. 1992).
81. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
82. Crawford, 839 S.W.2d at 757.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 757.
19971
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and that they hold themselves out as willing to provide the service for any
member of the public. Thus, the court answered the second and third
considerations of the Tunkl test in the affirmative. 85
The Crawford court next noted that because the average potential tenant is
faced with a "take it or leave it"86 standardized contract, the tenant's only solution
is to sign or reject the entire transaction. Normally, there is no provision
allowing the tenant to pay extra money for protection from a landlord's
negligence." Thus, the court answered the fourth and fifth considerations of
Tunkl in the affirmative. The court answered the final consideration of the Tunkl
test in the affirmative as well because residential leases place the person or
property under control of the landlord, subject to the landlord's carelessness.88
The defendants argued, however, that residential leases are purely private
affairs, not matters of public interest. In the past, where residential leases were
not as common, some courts recognized this as a valid argument.89 The
Crawford court responded by stating:
[W]e are not faced merely with the theoretical duty of construing
a provision in an isolated contract specifically bargained for by
one landlord and one tenant as a purely private affair. Considered
realistically, we are asked to construe an exculpatory clause, the
generalized use of which may have an impact upon thousands of
potential tenants. 90
Freedom of contract also has been restricted where common areas are
involved. Several jurisdictions have noted that exculpatory clauses should not
be upheld where the landlord maintains control of common areas.91 Because
85. Id. at 758.
86. Id, See also Lloyd v. Service Corp., 453 So. 2d 735, 735 (Ala. 1984).
87. Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tenn. 1992). However, some
courts have ruled that provisions allowing a reduction in rent in exchange for the
landlord's relief from liability are contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Foisy v. Wyman,
515 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1973). But see Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268, 272
(Cal. 1981).
88. Crawford, 839 S.W.2d at 758.
89. See Lloyd, 453 So. 2d at 738; Barkett v. Brucato, 264 P.2d 978 (Cal. Ct. App.
1953).
90. Crawford, 839 S.W.2d at 758 (citing McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 486
P.2d 1093, 1097 (Wash. 1971) (emphasis in original)). See also John D. Perovich,
Annotation, Validity of Exculpatory Clause in Lease Exempting Lessor From Liability,
49 A.L.R.3d 321 (1974).
91. Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705, 708 (Colo. Ct. App.). See, e.g.,
Middleton v. Lomaskin, 266 So. 2d 678, 680 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (dissent);
Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1982).
(Vol. 62
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such clauses create a possibility of threat to the public, these courts have held
such clauses to be void as against public policy.' 2
In Warren, the Missouri Supreme Court declined to use any of these
approaches. The court simply stated that although releases of future negligence
are disfavored and are to be strictly construed, such releases are not void as
against public policy.' To release a party from its own negligence, the language
of the exculpatory clause must be "clear, unambiguous, unmistakable, and
conspicuous."' The court stated that the defendants met their burden of proving
that the language was a release because "parties are presumed to read what they
sign.1
9 5
The Missouri Court of Appeals' analysis in Warren, not expressly adopted
by the Missouri Supreme Court, recognized that the exculpatory clause was a
"clear and unambiguous release." '96 In addition, the court of appeals found that
the record did not show any evidence of a gross disparity in bargaining power,
or that the "tenant was faced with a 'take it or leave it' agreement in order to
obtain adequate housing."' 9 The court of appeals also stated that the plaintiff did
not claim there was gross negligence or a public interest involved.98
Both the Missouri Supreme Court and the Missouri Court of Appeals found
that the precedent established by Alack v. Vic Tanny International, Inc. did not
forbid allowing exculpatory clauses in residential leases.99 The supreme court
simply found that the precedent established by Alack did not forbid allowing
exculpatory clauses in residential leases." ° Neither opinion, however, contained
any discussion about how the inherent relationship between landlord and tenant
or the existence of a standardized lease form could suggest unequal
bargaining.'0'
92. Stanley, 911 P.2d at 708. See, e.g., Cappaert, 413 So. 2d at 382.
93. Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, No. 79539, 1997 WL 471917, at *1
(Mo. 1997).
94. Id.
95. Id. at *2.
96. Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, No. 69866, 1996 WL 741844, at *2




99. Id.; Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, No. 79539, 1997 WL 471917
(Mo. Aug. 20, 1997).
100. Warren, 1997 WL 471917 at*1.
101. Id.; Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, No. 69866, 1996 WL 741844,
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group,"°2 the Missouri Supreme Court
held that exculpatory provisions in residential leases were not per se void, and
the exculpatory clause in dispute was enforceable under the facts of the case.
The court found that the defendants met their burden of proving that the
language was a valid release because parties are presumed to read what they
sign, and the plaintiffs signature was present on the five legal-sized pages of the
single-spaced form lease. 3
The court stated that in absence of other evidence, the parties appeared to
have reached an agreement on the release."' The plaintiff, however, failed to
reply to the defendants' affirmative defense of release. Because the defendants
did not object to this procedural error, the case was treated as if the plaintiff had
made a general denial of the affirmative defense. On appeal, such a matter is
treated "as if a reply traversing the defense has been filed in accordance with the
evidence."'0 5 Thus, because the trial court decided this case before the Alack
decision, the court remanded the case to the trial court to allow the plaintiff to
plead or introduce evidence on an avoidance of the defendants' affirmative
defense of release based on the holding of Alack 6 Because the case was
remanded. the court also commented on the defendants' other argument for
reversal, the lack of duty to remove snow and ice from the apartment complex. 17
The court rejected this argument, stating that the defendants assumed such a
duty. 08
In a concurring opinion, Judge Edward Robertson wrote that the case
should not have been remanded for a new trial, but instead should have been
remanded with directions for the trial court to enter judgment for the
defendants." 9 Judge Robertson stated that the plaintiff should not have been
allowed to answer the affirmative defense because nothing in the evidence
suggested that the plaintiff did not see the non-liability clause, that the plaintiff
was not aware of what she signed, or that the language of the clause was
ambiguous-claims which would have brought her under the Alack rule requiring
clear and unambiguous language."0 Judge Robertson stated that although the
102. Warren, 1997 WL 471917.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *2.
105. Id. (citing Mahurin v. St. Luke's Hosp., 809 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991)).
106. Warren, 1997 WL 471917 at *3
107. Id.
108. Id.
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plaintiff did not formally answer the defendants' affirmative defense, it was clear
that the trial court and the parties knew the nature of the parties' claims
surrounding the exculpatory clause, and that the plaintiff, having had every
opportunity to respond to the affirmative defense, raised "every legal and factual
claim to which her imagination entitled her."'
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Ronnie White stated that
the decision of the trial court should have been affirmed." 2 Judge White
reasoned that the clause at issue in Warren was not as conspicuous as Alack
requires, and that the defendants did not meet their burden of proving
conspicuousness.'" Judge White stated that because such clauses are disfavored,
"[t]here must be no doubt that a reasonable person agreeing to an exculpatory
clause actually understands what future claims he or she is waiving.""' 4 Judge
White believed that the language was not conspicuous because the clause was
in the twentieth paragraph of a thirty-three paragraph lease and was located at
the bottom of the second, single-typed page."5
The Missouri Supreme Court failed to expressly adopt the more detailed
analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, which stated that there
was no public policy violation and that the clause was enforceable because: 1)
the exculpatory clause contained a "clear and unambiguous" release of the
defendants future acts of negligence; 2) there was no evidence of gross disparity
in the two parties' bargaining power; 3) there was no evidence that the plaintiff
could not look for housing elsewhere to find a lease which did not include an
exculpatory clause; and 4) the case did not involve an intentional tort or gross
negligence and was not of public interest." 6
The majority opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court also made no
comment about several other issues decided by the court of appeals. For
example, no comment was made about the court of appeals' determination that
an exculpatory clause may be valid even though no bona fide controversy exists,
a variance from other types of releases." 7 The court of appeals also discussed
why the plaintiff failed in her argument that the clause was a covenant not to sue
and thus required consideration."' The court of appeals reasoned that the
plaintiff did not sign a covenant not to sue because, at the time the contract was
111. Warren, 1997 WL 471917 at *5.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *6.
114. Id. at *5.
115. Id. at *6.
116. Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, No. 69866, 1996 WL 741844, at *2
(Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1996), transferred, No. 79539, 1997 WL 471917 (Mo. Aug. 20,
1997).
117. Id.
118. Id. at *3.
1997]
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signed, there was no existing claim."19 The exculpatory clause relieved the
defendant from future acts of negligence, and thus was distinguishable from
cases involving the covenants not to sue.' 20
The court of appeals also rejected the plaintiffs final argument that the
exculpatory language was "meaningless boilerplate.' 2' The plaintiff cited to
Maples v. Charles Burt Realtor, Inc., where exculpatory language was found not
to bar a claim for the defendant's fraudulent conduct." The court of appeals
distinguished the case from the present dispute in that the former involved
fraudulent conduct and a general exculpatory clause, while the case at bar
involved mere negligence and a clause which specifically stated that the
defendant was not liable for any negligence."
In ruling that the exculpatory clause was not void, the Missouri Supreme
Court in Warren failed to follow the trend of recent decisions in several other
jurisdictions, where courts have found exculpatory contracts in residential leases
unfair due to the inherent disparity in bargaining power between a landlord and
a tenant, a tenant's lack of any real alternative, and the public interest in
obtaining adequate housing. 24 The court found no reason not to expressly
extend the Alack rule to residential leases. 25
V. COMMENT
The Missouri Supreme Court in Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group'26
did what other jurisdictions have refused to do-it upheld an exculpatory clause
in a residential lease. However, the court established no clear path for other
courts to follow. Although the court made it clear that exculpatory clauses in
residential leases were not per se void, it failed to provide a clear set of
guidelines for subsequent determinations of similar cases. The court read the
Alack opinion-holding that "[a]lthough exculpatory clauses in contracts
releasing an individual from his or her own future negligence are disfavored,
they are not prohibited against public policy"' 27-as applicable to residential
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Warren, 1996 WL 741844 at *3.
122. Id. (citing Maples v. Charles Burt Realtor, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 202, 213 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985)).
123. Warren, 1996 WL 741844 at *3.
124. See supra, note 52.
125. Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, No. 79539, 1997 WL 471917, at *3
(Mo. Aug. 20, 1997).
126. Id.
127. Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. 1996).
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leases as well. 2 ' Although Alack in no way limited its ruling, it made no
mention of its applicability to residential leases.
In addition, the Alack court expressly stated that a matter involving a public
interest could not be contracted away.'29 Yet the Warren court failed to
thoroughly consider whether the residential lease involved a public interest.
Furthermore, in its consideration of the Warren case, the Missouri Court of
Appeals explicitly concluded that no public interest was involved, without
considering the relationship between a landlord and tenant or the availability of
adequate housing."'
Other courts that have delved into this issue have recognized that although
the residential landlord-tenant relationship was once an area of purely private
interest, the increasing demand for affordable residential housing has created a
public interest.' It can hardly be argued that there is equal bargaining power
between the typical landlord and tenant. It is unlikely that a tenant who does not
like the terms of a lease can refuse to enter into it and find a more favorable lease
elsewhere. 32 While this may have been possible in the 1940s and 1950s, the
current demand for affordable housing has created a business in which landlords
have much more leverage, and an era in which a lease without an exculpatory
clause is an extreme rarity.'33 In addition, a tenant who does not like the terms
of a lease often cannot negotiate with the landlord to pay an increased price in
exchange for the landlord's omission of the exculpatory clause.3 4
Such problems undoubtedly exist, but the Warren court failed to consider
them. If the court had applied either the five-factor Lloyd test or the six-factor
Tunkl test used by the Crawford court, it is doubtful that it would have reached
the same outcome.
The facts in the instant case are even more supportive of a ruling declaring
the exculpatory provision invalid than the facts of Crawford. In Crawford, the
tenant sued for the landlord's negligent failure to maintain a fire alarm in an area
within the tenant's exclusive control. 135 As previously stated, there is a stronger
128. Warren, 1997 WL 471917 at *1.
129. Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337.
130. Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, No. 69866, 1996 WL 741844, at *2
(Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1996), transferred, No. 79539, 1997 WL 471917 (Mo. Aug. 20,
1997).
131. Lloyd v. Service Corp., Inc., 453 So. 2d 735, 737-39 (Ala. 1984); Crawford
v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 756-59 (Tenn. 1991).
132. See Lloyd, 453 So. 2d 735, 739; Crawford, 839 S.W.2d 754, 758;
McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 486 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Wash. 1971).
133. See Lloyd, 453 So. 2d 735, 739.
134. Crawford, 839 S.W.2d 754, 758.
135. See Stanley v. Creighton, Co., 911 P.2d 705, 708 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996);
Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378, 379 (Miss. 1982).
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argument for relieving a landlord of liability when the negligence arises in an
area not under the landlord's exclusive control. In Warren, the tenant
complained about the landlord's failure to maintain a walkway, a common area
within the landlord's exclusive control) 36 Therefore, if applied to the facts in
Warren, the sixth requirement of the Tunkl test-that property be under control
of the landlord-would be answered in the affirmative as well. The first five
Tunkl requirements also would be answered in the affirmative when applied to
Warren, merely based upon the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship.
In addition, Missouri courts have recognized a tort cause of action against
a landlord for failure to maintain common areas in a reasonably safe condition,'37
a duty which does not apply to areas under a tenant's exclusive control.' A
situation similar to the facts of Warren arose in Maschoff v. Koedding.39 A
tenant of an apartment complex slipped on some snow that the landlord failed
to clear off the parking lot." The court held that the landlord breached his duty
to maintain the common areas in a reasonably safe manner and ruled for the
tenant.' 4' Thus, the Warren court would have been in accordance with existing
case law had it ruled that this common law duty defined public policy and could
not be waived. 42
Thus, without fully analyzing the issue, the Warren court ruled on an
important area of the law, taking away valuable protection from tenants in the
process. Although other jurisdictions also have held that residential exculpatory
clauses are not per se void, few have placed such minor restrictions upon their
use.
43
136. Warren v. Paragon Technologies Group, No. 79539 WL 471917, at *3 (Mo.
Aug. 20, 1997).
137. Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Mo. 1988). See also Erhardt v.
Lowe, 596 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
138. Pate v. Reeves, 719 S.W.2d 956 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
139. 439 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
140. Id. at 235.
141. Id. at 237.
142. See supra note 60.
143. See, e.g., Porter v. Lumbermen's Investment Corp., 606 S.W.2d at 715, 717
(Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (unless "gross disparity in bargaining power").
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In its brief opinion, the Warren court extended the general rule of allowing
exculpatory clauses to residential leases. 44 The court, in the course of its
decision, necessarily (albeit implicitly) found that no unequal bargaining power
existed between the tenant and the landlord, and that no public interest was
involved. Although the court did not rule that all residential exculpatory clauses
will be upheld, it implied that recovery by tenants most likely will be barred in
the absence of extraordinary factors.
KAREN A. READ
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